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When the Soviet Union began to unravel in the late 1980s, many observers expected that
the 25 million ethnic Russians who lived in the non-Russian republics represented an
important group of people who could be mobilized by ‘empire-savers’ to stem this process.
Russians who would end up as minorities in new nationalizing states, had little if anything
to gain from state disintegration. They were also highly resourceful in terms of education
and occupational positions. The sinister role which ethnic Serbs played in Slobodan
Milosevic’s schemes to salvage the Yugoslav state boded ill, as did the bloody war waged
by France in Algeria in protection of the pied-noirs in the 1950s.
As it turned out, the Russians in the non-Russian republics for the most part remained
remarkably passive, and this contributed in no small degree to the tranquil transition to a new
political map in Eurasia. This article is an attempt to explain this counterintuitive outcome. I
revisit a typologyof identity trajectories for the Russiandiasporawhich I developed in themid-
1990s and conclude that its basic insights remain valid. At that time I had argued that Russians
outside the RSFSR had already for some timebeen going through a process of dissociation from
the Russian core group. They were adopting some cultural traits from the local population
without undergoing any kind of assimilation.While therewere important regional varieties as
well as generational differenceswithin each Russophone community, as a general rule it could
besaidthat theyhaddevelopedan identityof theirown,ormoreprecisely:one local identity for
each republic. In this way Russian ethnic solidarity was weakened and the mobilizational
potential of the diaspora issue for political purposes was diminished.
Empirical research carried out by myself and others over the last 15 years, including large-
scale opinionpolls, seem to conﬁrm these assumptions. After the break-upof theunitary state
the distance between the identity trajectories of the various Russian-speaking post-Soviet
communities have gradually grownwider, for a number of reasons. Those Russianswhowere
leastwillingor able toadapt to thenewpolitical circumstanceshave inmanycases returned to
Russia, making it even more important for those who remain to learn the local language and
ﬁnd their cultural-political niche in their country of residence as a national minority.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,HanyWhen I began teaching Russian area studies at the
University of Oslo in 1990, the so-called ‘new Russian dias-
pora’ had suddenly become a hotly disputed topic on the
political as well as on the academic agenda. Until that time
hardly anyone had paid much attention to the fact that
millions of ethnic Russians – 25 millions to be more exact –
were living within the USSR but outside the RussianangUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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a federation, was perceived as a strongly centralized state,
and most Sovietologists concentrated on political develop-
ments in Moscow, if not to say: in the Kremlin. Secondly,
ethnic issues were generally not regarded as politically
important, and attracted few students. Finally, to the extent
that the ethnicmake-up of theUSSRwas taken note of at all,
most observers found it quite natural that ethnic Russians
were living all over the country. The USSR functioned as
a single job market, and it was only to be expected that
people moved around from one republic to another.
It is a moot issue to what extent ethnicity really was an
independent source of change behind the processes that
led up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The reform
policies of the Gorbachev administration were initiated
from above, with little pressure from below, and primarily
for economic reasons. The new leaders in the Kremlin had
an acute sense that their country was falling ever further
behind the most advanced Western countries in economic
development, and concluded that they had to introduce
a measure of political liberalism in order to reinvigorate
Soviet society. In some republics the new scope for political
initiative from below was used by local politicians to press
for more republican power. Soon also activists outside the
party seized upon ethnicity as a means to mobilize the
population against the communist system. In a country like
Poland, the communist regime had been challenged by
a massive popular movement organized as a labor union,
the Solidarnosc, with strong backing from the national
church, Polish Catholicism. In the Soviet Union, on the other
hand, the labor unions were completely docile and could
not play any similar role as a vessel for opposition, and the
church had no tradition of independent action. In this
country, the only potential collective identity that could be
activated for political purposes was ethnicity. Unlike reli-
gion, ethnicity had not been suppressed in the Soviet
Union, on the contrary it had been pervasively institution-
alized, on two levels: Individually, as all Soviet citizens
carried with them at all times their internal passport in
which their personal, ascriptive ethnicity or ‘nationality’
was marked in the so-called 5th point; on the collective
level, as the entire state was organized as a gigantic
federation of ethnically deﬁned republics (Slezkine, 1994;
Suny, 1993). During perestroika, these two levels were
politicized simultaneously and combined in a highly
combustive mix: the new political entrepreneurs deman-
ded independence for their republics with an ethnic justi-
ﬁcation: Ukraine was cast as the homeland of ethnic
Ukrainians, Latvia as the homeland of Latvians, and so on.
The correspondence between the republican structure and
the ethnic map of the Soviet Union, however, was, as we all
know, far from perfect. Not only millions of ethnic Russians,
but also multitudes of other Soviet citizens lived outside
their putative ‘homeland’. In the new ethnicized political
climate these people were increasingly regarded as literally
‘out of place’.
As these developments were unfolding in the Soviet
Union, similar processes took place in Yugoslavia, another
communist federation that exhibited many of the same
features as the USSR: also in Yugoslavia, ethnicity was the
deﬁning feature of the federation, in fact, the Yugoslavcommunists had taken over the ethnofederal idea from the
Soviets at the time when Tito and Stalin were still on good
terms. And importantly, in Yugoslavia, just asmuch as in the
USSR, a substantial portion of the population lived outside
the republic that was named after ‘their’ ethnic group. Also
in Yugoslavia the geographical dispersion of the largest
ethnic group, in this case the Serbs, represented a particu-
larly important obstacle to a peaceful dismemberment of
the unitary state into ethnically deﬁned components: the
Serbs lived in large numbers outside Serbia – in Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, andMontenegro– aswell as in the two
ethnic units that were formally parts of the Serb republic,
Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Serb population in Croatia,
Bosnia, and Kosovo soon got caught up in a frenzy of ethnic
violence: inwars that erupted in these republics in the1990s
somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 people were
killed. In these wars the status and situation of the local
Serbs was one of the major bones of contention.
The Yugoslav carnage sent shockwaves throughout the
world and the parallels between the internal Serbian
diaspora in Yugoslavia and the internal Russian diaspora in
USSR were not lost on political pundits. Alarmists feared
that a blow-up of the Soviet Union could lead to a Yugoslav
scenario writ large. Another sinister parallel was the
dissolution of the French colonial empire: France had not
accepted imperial decline peacefully, and the most pro-
tracted killings took place precisely in Algeria, the colony in
which the highest number of French settlers were living.
Still other worrying examples are the way the diaspora
issue was used by the post-Trianon regime in Hungary in
the interwar period and by Nazi Germany in the political
games leading up to World War II.
As it happened, however, thebreakupof the SovietUnion
entailed remarkably little violence. It was an ‘implosion’
rather than an explosion. To be sure, there was bloodshed
and even full-sized civil wars in some republics – Tajikistan
and Azerbaijan/Armenia were the worst cases, with tens of
thousands of casualties each place. We ought to recognize,
however, that compared to what was taking place in Yugo-
slavia at the time, this was far less than what could have
occurred in theSovietUnion, andweought tobe thankful for
that. This outcome was far from obvious at the time and
requires an explanation.
The answer clearly must be sought in several indepen-
dent circumstances. On the level of national politics, there
was a crucial difference in the role played by the leaders of
the two largest republics, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and
Boris Yeltsin in Russia. Milosevic pursued an actively
confrontational course vis-à-vis the other Yugoslav repub-
lics while Boris Yeltsin for his part sought allianceswith the
other republican leaders in the USSR. The behavior of the
Russian leader was perfectly rational under the circum-
stances: Yeltsin’s main political foe was Gorbachev, the
president of the Soviet Union, and in the power struggle
between these two men it was a smart move of Yeltsin to
align himself with non-Russian leaders who had an interest
in eliminating Gorbachev’s power base, the USSR (Dunlop,
1993). In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, there was no
counterpart to Gorbachev against whom Milosevic had to
struggle, and all the destructive energies of the Serbian
presidentwere spent on confrontationswith the non-Serbs.
Table 1
Ratio of indigenous and Russian students within union republics 1959/60
and 1969/70.
Republic Nationality Students per 1000
conationals in rep.
1959/ 1969/1960
1970
RSFSR Russians 20.7
Estonia Estonians
Russians
12.4
8.0
17.3
14.5
Latvia Latvians
Russians
10.7
9.4
14.3
22.6
Lithuania Lithuanians
Russians
11.0
6.8
19.0
21.9
Belarus Belarusians
Russians
6.1
19.2
12.2
36.4
Moldova Moldovans
Russians
5.1
15.0
10.1
19.1
Ukraine Ukrainians
Russians
8.1
17.6
15.1
29.3
Georgia Georgians
Russians
16.6
13.2
23.6
14.6
Azerbaijan Azerbaijanis
Russians
10.2
10.6
20.8
23.7
Turkmenistan Turkmens
Russians
7.9
14.9
13.4
19.9
Tajikistan Tajiks
Russians
9.0
17.8
13.6
26.7
Uzbekistan Uzbeks
Russians
9.5
24.0
17.2
29.7
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzs
Russians
9.8
10.2
17.8
19.8
Kazakhstan Kazakhs
Russians
11.2
8.6
18.9
15.4
Source: Karklins (1984, p. 284).
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the dominant ethnic group in the two countries, the Serbs
outside Serbia and the Russians outside Russia? With a few
exceptions, the Russian diasporians did not mobilize but
remained rather passive. Indicatively, the most violent
conﬂicts during the dissolution of the Soviet Union took
place precisely in those republics where very few Russians
were living, such as Tajikistan and Armenia/Azerbaijan, and
the local Russians were not involved. Only in one instance
were ethnic Russians involved in a civil war, in Moldova in
1992 (Kolstø, Edemsky, et al., 1993).
During perestroika Soviet loyalists in some republics
organized so-called ‘inter-fronts’ to ﬁght for the preserva-
tion of the Soviet unitary state. This was a countermove to
the establishment of so-called ‘popular fronts’ that fought
ﬁrst for the cultural rights of the titular nation and later also
for political sovereignty for the republics. While some local
Russians sympathized with the popular fronts and a few
titulars supported the interfronts, it is fair to say that the
standoff between these two types of movements pitted
Russophones and titulars against each other. This was
a battle which the Russophones lost resoundingly. Their
rallies were pitifully small compared to the massive gath-
eringswhich the popular fronts couldmuster. A remarkable
feature of interfronts rallies was also the high average age
among the participants (Kolstø, 1995, 113), It seems almost
as if the only Soviet loyalists in the republics who were
willing to take to the streets to protest against the wave of
titular nationalism, were the pensioners.
To be sure, some local activists among the Russians in
the non-Russian republics did organize peacefully in the
early 1990s, by starting Russian obshchiny, cultural centers,
and so on. When I and other researchers who were inter-
ested in the plight of the Russian diasporians at that time
travelled to the various republics, we naturally visited these
centers, talked to their leaders, and read their newsletters.
Sometimes these centers gave the impression of being
quite vibrant and active, with articulate and energetic
leaders. Very often, however, this impression was
misleading. In a population of some hundred thousand
Russians, or even millions, a handful of activists were not
able to make much of an impact. As it turned out, these
centers in many cases consisted of many chiefs and few
Indians. The vast majority of the local Russians often had
not heard of their self-appointed spokespersons, and if they
had, they remained indifferent to their activities. Thus, for
instance in a study of the Russophone cultural center Lad in
Kazakhstan, Sebastien Peyrouse found that the imperial
orientation of the self-appointed Russophone leaders
found little resonance in the Russophone population in
Kazakhstan at large. ‘The discursive radicalism of the
associations representing the Russians in Kazakhstan is
thus correlated with the reality of their mediocre inﬂuence
on Russophone populations’ (Peyrouse, 2008, 119).
This Russian tranquility is quite remarkable since there
were many good reasons why we should anticipate mobi-
lization, and I will point to some of them. The ﬁrst is the
resource factor.Many students of political mobilization have
pointed to the availability of resources as a critical factor
behind collective action (for instance Tarrow, 1994). In
general terms the Russians living in the non-Russianrepublics must indeed be characterized as highly
resourceful. On the average they had a level of education
well above the level of the local indigenous population. This
was true in particular with regard to Moldova, Central Asia,
and the Slavic republics, but not so much in the Baltics and
Transcaucasia (see Table 1. It should be noted that this table
probably underreports Russian education somewhat since
it registered only students studying in the republics. Ethnic
Russians to a higher degree than non-Russians tended to go
to Russia – Moscow and Leningrad – for their studies.)
Ethnic Russians in the republics were highly urbanized
and clustered primarily in the capital and other large cities.
They were more often employed in white collar jobs and in
general belonged to what one might loosely call ‘the
intelligentsia’, in particular the technical intelligentsia
(Kaiser, 1994, chapter 5). The percentage among themwho
worked in prestigious and inﬂuential positions was clearly
higher than among Russians in the RSFSR, which suggests
that geographical and social mobility often go together (see
Table 2). This is a phenomenon often observed also among
other diaspora groups as well (Chua, 2003; Cohen, 1997).
One important resource, whichMichelle Commercio has
recently drawn attention to, is access to informal networks
(Commercio, 2010). This factor, however, was unevenly
distributed among the various Russian diaspora communi-
ties and this, Commercio believes, may explain why
Russians in some republics mobilized politically during and
after perestroika to a higher degree than in other republics.
In casu, she compares Latvia and Kyrgyzstan and ﬁnds that
Table 2
Work proﬁle of ethnic Russians in the non-Russian republics, 1989, in percentages.
Republic Intellectual work Physical work outside agriculture Agricultural work
1 2 1 2 1 2
Estonia 34.5 7 4 63.4 þ18 þ9 2.1 78 66
Latvia 37.8 þ12 þ5 57.9 þ7 0 4.3 64 31
Lithuania 40.9 þ22 þ14 56.3 þ1 3 2.8 75 55
Belarus 47.9 þ64 þ33 48.6 16 16 3.5 73 44
Moldova 44.4 þ128 þ24 51.7 4 11 3.9 85 37
Ukraine 38.6 þ31 þ8 57.3 0 1 4.1 70 34
Georgia 44.5 þ15 þ24 51.7 þ26 þ11 3.8 81 39
Azerbaijan 45.5 þ61 þ27 52.1 þ5 10 2.4 89 61
Armenia 53.9 þ47 þ50 43.1 23 26 3.0 66 52
Turkmenistan 50.0 þ60 þ39 48.6 þ72 16 1.4 93 77
Tajikistan 47.8 þ132 þ33 50.2 þ22 13 2.0 95 68
Uzbekistan 47.8 þ94 þ33 51.0 þ16 12 4.4 72 29
Kyrgyzstan 38.7 þ43 þ8 56.9 þ17 2 4.4 72 29
Kazakhstan 35.6 þ10 1 58.8 þ26 þ2 5.6 73 10
1¼Different from titulars in republic, in percentage.
2¼Different from Russians in Russia, in percentage.Source: Arutunian (1992, pp. 93–4).
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powerful networks to draw on than in the latter. Access to
power in Central Asia was gained through tightly knit
kinship networks fromwhich the Europeanswere excluded.
These traditional networks were not disrupted under the
Soviet system; on the contrary, in many places they thrived
and blossomed. The Brezhnev regime largely accepted that
political power in the Asian republics remained concen-
trated in the hands of the titular nationality, as long as the
local leadership did not challenge the central power struc-
tures in Moscow.
2. Furthermore, the grievances which the Russian dia-
sporians experienced would lead us to expect mobiliza-
tion in defense of their rights. Many theories of ethnic
conﬂict take as their starting point that people rebel when
they are aggrieved (for instance Gurr, 1993, pp. 61–88).
Even if there are important differences among the various
republics it is fair to say that the Russians most places have
had ample ground to feel discriminated against. In Estonia
and Latvia they were denied the right to obtain original
citizenship such as the titular population was granted.
They had to apply for citizenship on a par with recent
immigrants, and fulﬁll relatively stringent criteria as
regards residence, proﬁciency in the state language, etc.
Moreover, also in some states where the Russians do enjoy
full voting rights they are not automatically guaranteed
political representation in proportion to their share of the
total population. After independence the titular nation-
ality has to an increasing degree monopolized political
positions.
In many new states, particularly in Transcaucasia and
Central Asia, Russians have also gradually been squeezed
out of their top level jobs in administration, technical
professions and other white color professions. The Russians
seem to resent this kind of discrimination more than
political marginalization, as it hits them where it hurts
most – in professional opportunities, income levels, and
standards of living. Also in the Baltics the ‘locals’ are
gradually monopolizing entire sectors of the labor market,
particularly jobs in the state bureaucracy (Kolstø, 2008).2. Identity as a mobilizational factor
In their book Ethnic Conﬂict inWorld Politics TedGurr and
Barbara Harff point to group discrimination as one major
trigger behind ethnic mobilization. In their view, however,
discrimination is not a sufﬁcient factor; it has to be
combinedwith group cohesion in order to unleash collective
action. Discrimination leads to resentment and anger, but
not necessarily tomobilization, they assert. If the group that
is discriminated against share a high degree of common
ethnic identity, the likelihood increases that their reaction
will take the form of a collective action. Conversely, if group
cohesion is lacking, the likelihood that mobilization will
take place is considerably reduced (Gurr & Harff, 1994). This
leads us to the crucial question of identity. There are good
reasons to believe that this variable is an important factor
that may explain the low degree of collective action among
Russians in the non-Russian republics.
Russians in the Soviet Union, and in the tsarist empire
before that, seem to have had a rather weak sense of ethnic
identity. This is not to say that they were devoid of any
collective identity altogether. Russian nationalism has no
doubt been a phenomenon in the past, and continues to
exist today. Historically, however, this nationalism did not
focus primarily on ethnicity or culture. To be sure, ethno-
cultural Russian nationalism did and does exist – Alexander
Solzhenitsyn may be regarded as an important spokes-
person of this tendency – but it has not been dominant.
Much more common is state-oriented nationalism. A typical
attitude among Russian nationalists was and is pride in the
huge state which had been established on the vast Eurasian
continent and of which theywere citizens. The fact that this
is a multiethnic state does not bother themmuch, rather, it
is seen as quite natural (Hosking, 1997; Szporluk, 1989).
This has several important consequences. It meant that
during the perestroika it was possible to mobilize Russians
in support of the threatened unitary Soviet state – in the
interfronts – even if these movements, as pointed out
above, were far more modest and torpid than the compa-
rable movements in support of centrifugal non-Russian
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territory in collective Russian identity is that Russian ethnic
consciousness has remained generally weak. Like other
Soviet citizens, also ethnic Russians had their natsionalnost’
written into their passport and other ID documents, but
this, it seems, did not bring about the same strong ethnic
attachment as in most other groups. In order to explain
why this was so, Rogers Brubaker draws a parallel to the
USA. Also in the USA ethnicity is an important identity
marker, but not equally strong for all groups. ‘Whiteness’ is
in a sense the quality of being unmarked, of not being
‘ethnic’ at all. The same was the case with Russianness in
the USSR. ‘Russianness was a zero-value, an unthematized
background condition,’ Brubaker argues (Brubaker, 1996, p.
49) There are good reasons to regard ‘Russians’ in the Soviet
Union as a category rather than as a group, if we by the term
‘group’ imply cohesion, solidarity, and a sense of common
identity.
Brubaker does, however, believe that Russians who lived
in the republics were more conscious of their nationality
than Russians in the RSFSR. This was a reaction to the
increased assertiveness on the part of the titular nationali-
ties, he maintains (Brubaker, 1996, p. 49). But even if many
Russians in the republics did have a keen feeling of being
different from the local population this does not mean that
they necessarily identiﬁed with the entire Russian group as
a collectivity. As I travelled around in the non-Russian
republics in the 1990s, I often had the chance to discuss
identity questions with Russian activists and community
leaders in the non-Russian republics. When I asked if they
believed that local Russians were in any way different from
Russians in the Russian Federation, I was struck by the
uniformity of their answers. Almost without exception they
would insist that ‘of course’ theyweredifferent, it couldbeno
question about it. Their answers also revealed that they had
a very positive self-perception when they compared them-
selves to Russians in the core group. The qualitieswhich they
ascribed to Russians in their own republic were generally
better than what they associated with Russians in general:
They believed that they hadhigher personal standards;were
more conscientious andhardworking; less given todrinking;
and had more stable marriages (Kolstø, 1999, 2002). When
asked to explainwhy this was the case, they often pointed to
the wholesome inﬂuence of the indigenous people among
whom they were living. Thus, for instance, Russians in
Estonia would claim that they were highly disciplined and
hardworking because they had been imbued with the Esto-
nians’ Protestant work ethic. At the same time, Russians in
Estonia did not claim to be particularly faithful spouses,
having instead the same high divorce rates as Estonians. In
Central Asia, by contrast, the local Russiansweremore proud
of their marital ﬁdelity and bragged less about their consci-
entiousness at work: allegedly, the traditional values of the
local Muslim communities had rubbed off on them.
Similar responses also the Russian researcher Nadezhda
Lebedeva received from Russian diaspora members whom
she interviewed in 1994–1995 (Lebedeva, 1995, pp. 45–7,
190, 220, passim). Lebedeva also found that according to
local Russians in Kazakhstan, the titular nation had adopted
quite a few Russian habits and mores, and not only positive
ones. Quite often Kazakhstani Russians believed that theethnic Kazakh had been affected by a Russian way of life by
taking over such character traits as lower moral standards,
bureaucatism, slovenliness, impudence, and a habit of
heavy drinking (Lebedeva, 1995, 43).
We are of course talking here about stereotypes, but as
the so-called Thomas theorem goes, ‘If men deﬁne situa-
tions as real, they are real in their consequences’. And the
skeptical attitudes of the diaspora Russians towards
Russians in the core group were to a large extent recipro-
catedbyRussians inRussia. Russians fromthe republicswho
movedback toRussia frequently reported that they received
a less than cordial welcome. As one leader of a local ‘Slavic
Diaspora’ organization in southern Kyrgyzstan complained
in1993: ‘Moreoften thannot thosewhothink that theyhave
arrived in their historical homeland, ﬁnd that they are
regarded as aliens’ (Uleev, 1993, p. 3).
We should, however, avoid dichotomizing descriptions
of the Russian ethnic group as consisting of two parts only –
a core and a periphery – as if each of these two parts had
a high degree of cohesion internally. That does not seem to
be the case. In my discussions with Russian activists in the
non-Russian republics I have been struck by their lack of
knowledge about, and even interest in, the plight of their
co-ethnics in the other republics. Their frame of reference is
the country in which they are living. This is true both of
those who make an effort to adapt and of activists who
complain bitterly about discrimination and feel thoroughly
alienated from the political regime in their country of
residence. Life in the neighboring countries seems to be
quite literally foreign to them. As one leading Russian
expert on the Russian diaspora, Igor Zevelev, has remarked,
‘a characteristic trait of the Russian diasporas is their
fragmentation and weak mobilization. There are no
noticeable horizontal links between them. They are
distinguishable by size, life style, and level of integration
into the local society. They do not have a common enemy or
common dreams for the future.’ (Zevelev, 2008, p. 6).
An important line of division within the Russian dias-
pora communities runs between old-timers and recent
arrivals. While some Russians have been born in the
republics, as had in some cases even their parents, others
came as adults, in order to study, serve there in the military
or – most commonly – in search of work. The latecomers
became in many ways less integrated into the local culture
and society. One clear sign of this was their lack of famil-
iarity with the local language. Few Russians in the republics
knew the titular language well, but those who had lived
there all or most of their life could often make themselves
understood in the shops or at the bazaar. This was far less
common among the recent immigrants. Those Russians
who did not learn the local language were not consigned to
a Russian-language ghetto, since they could always expect
to be understood when they spoke Russian. Even so, they
cut themselves off from the local culture in away that more
adaptable Russians did not.
3. After the break-up, new trajectories
I believe that the blurred and diffuse group identity of
ethnic Russians in the Soviet Union was one important
factor behind the peaceful outcome of the processes that
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beyond Russia from 1995, Neil Melvin concluded that ‘even
in the late 1980s Russians remained ethnically unconsoli-
dated’ (Melvin, 1995, p. 125). If this was a correct descrip-
tion of the situation prior to and during perestroika, how
has the situation evolved since that time?More speciﬁcally,
are the Russians adapting, mentally and socially, to the new
political realities, or may we see a backlash of a new
nostalgia for the good old days under the Communist
regime, the time before the nationalizing policies in the
new states commenced?
In an article in Ethnic and Racial studies in 1996 I
developed a typology of possible identity trajectories of the
Russians in the former Soviet republics (see Table 3). It
could be interesting to revisit this article today and see if
we now can give any more speciﬁc answers.
As you will see, in this matrix I operated with four
possible political loyalties along the vertical axis and three
cultural identities or self-understandings on the horizontal
axis. Some boxes were empty since they represent highly
unlikely or even self-contradictory outcomes. Thus, for
instance, if a person assimilates culturally into the nation-
alizing state of reference, he or she is not likely to hang on
to a political loyalty to the external homeland, Russia.
Let us now go through the various identity options by
moving down the political axis.
1. Continued attachment to the former Soviet Union was
certainly strong among many Russians in the ﬁrst years
after the dissolution of the unitary state, among dia-
sporians as well as among people in Russia. This attitude
revealed itself for instance in the resolution in the State
Duma in March 1996 which denounced the dissolution of
the Soviet Unionwith 250 votes against 98 (Kolstø, 2000, p.
204). This attachment, however, is bound to be weakened
over time. Over the last 20 years a whole new generation
has grown up who has no personal recollections of the
Soviet state. Most people realize that restitution of this
state is a completely lost case. In 1998 Natalia Kosmarskaia
found that 25–30 per cent of Russians in Kyrgyzstan still
identiﬁed with ‘the Soviet people’ as the community of
people they belonged to (Kosmarskaia, 2006, pp. 377–8).
Some will regard this as much, others as little, but the
important point which Kosmarskaia makes is that Soviet
nostalgia does not inﬂuence people’s actions in the way the
alternative options do: it is a purely emotional background
factor. When people have to make choices, alternatives
which actually exist have a kind of ontological upper hand
over hypothetical alternatives.Table 3
Possible Russian diaspora identities.
Political loyalty Cultural selfunderstanding
A
External homeland
1 Historical boundaries
(reconstitution of the USSR)
Traditional Soviet
2. External Homeland (Russia) Irredentism
3. New state of its own
4. Nationalizing state of residence Integrating national minority
Source: Kolstø (1996).2. In contrast to the USSR the Russian Federation does
indeed exist, and political allegiance to Russia is a real
alternative for Russian diasporians. Several factors ensure
that Russia also today exerts a considerable pull on
Russians in the other post-Soviet republics. First and fore-
most, Russian media continues to enjoy a strong position in
most of the Soviet successor states. Popular Russian
newspapers like Komsomol’skaia Pravda and Argumenty i
fakty can be bought virtually all over the former Soviet
space. These newspapers are edited in Moscow, but printed
in the republican capitals. As was the case before the
breakup of the USSR they also have some locally edited
pages focusing on matters in the republics in which they
are sold. In any case, they function as an important source
of information about the ‘external homeland’.
Even more important than the print media is television.
For most people in most countries TV is their main source
of information and entertainment, and the former Soviet
Union is no exception in this regard. It is probably true that
most Russians in the new states today are just as up-dated
on Russian politics as on politics in their state of residence,
if not more. By watching Russian soap operas, reality TV,
and talk shows they also become in a sense a part of
a Russian virtual space. As Michael Billig (1995) has
emphasized, our ideas about who we are, are strongly
inﬂuenced by the lexicon and images used in the media.
When the anchor man on the evening news says ‘here’ or
‘wehave’, the viewers do not have to be told where ‘here’ is,
or who ‘we’ are: it is ‘in our country’ and ‘our nation’. In that
way, Russian TV viewers in the new states are in a sense
subconsciously sucked into a Russia-centered universe.
There are, however, clear limits to this mechanism of
identiﬁcation. When the meteorologist on Russian TV
stands in front of a map of Russia and announces that ‘we’
will have nice weather tomorrow, the Russians in Moldova
or Kazakhstan know that the city they live in, is not on that
map. They are not included in the large ‘we’ which the
meteorologist invites the viewers to participate in. Poten-
tially, therefore, the psychological processes Billig has
identiﬁed may lead to an alienation process in a diaspora
situation. This is just a hypothesis which hopefully
someone one day will test out empirically.
An important factor which weakens the Russia option
for the Russians in the non-Russian states is the diaspora
policy pursued by the Russian Federation. This claim may
seem surprising since the general view is that Russia has
been rather aggressive in its defense of the Russians in the
other former Soviet republics, in particular in Estonia andB
New
C
Nationalizing state of residence
New Cossacks
(maximum programme)
New Cossacks
(minimum programme)
The Dniester Syndrome
Integrating new Diaspora Assimilation
1 In 1995 and 1996 Edwin Poppe and Louk Hagendoorn carried out
large-scale opinion surveys in ﬁve post-Soviet republics on ‘types of
identiﬁcation among Russians in “the Near Abroad’. Their ﬁndings, they
concluded, were ‘similar to the expectations put forward by Kolstø in his
identity-trajectory model.’ (Poppe & Hagendoorn, 2001, 69).
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country has a right and a duty to pose as the protector of all
Russians in the so-called ‘near abroad’. In ofﬁcial parlance
these people are called sootechestvenniki or ‘compatriots’,
even if they, strictly speaking, do not share a common
‘fatherland’ with Russians in Russia, except in those cases
when they have taken up Russian citizenship. The Russian
law ‘On Relations with Sootechestvenniki Abroad’ was
adopted in 1999 and, with some amendments, still remain
in force (Poccjkcla> Veeepaxj>, 2009). This law loudly
declares that ‘Sootechestvenniki who reside abroad are
entitled to support from the Russian Federation in the
realization of their civil, political, social, economic, and
cultural rights’. Speciﬁcally, the diaspora groups may
expect to receive diplomatic support when their rights are
violated, as well as ﬁnancial support for cultural and
educational institutions and facilities.
In 1995, Neil Melvin (1995, p. 127) argued that in part
through theefforts of politiciansandactivists inRussia ‘large
sections of the Russian-speaking settler communities have,
for the ﬁrst time, begun to think of themselves as members
of the Russian nation and of the Russian Federation as their
homeland’.Most observers, however, interpret the effects of
the Russian diaspora policy differently. Russian saber
rattling vis-à-vis those former Soviet republics that
discriminate against the local Russians has not been fol-
lowedupbymilitantpolicies of anykind.A recent analysis of
Russian foreign policy concludes that ‘as before, Russian
diaspora policy has a most diffuse character’ (Kortunov,
2009, p. 233). Michelle Commercio (2010, p. 19) claims
that ‘Russia has made noise on a sporadic basis about the
treatment of its compatriots in the “near abroad” but has
done very little to alleviate grievances.’ Themeans that have
been set aside for diaspora support have often beenmiserly.
In the 1990s this could perhaps be explained byRussia’s dire
ﬁnancial situation, but in spite of the establishment of
special programs in support of the diaspora in 2006 and
2007, this remiss policy has basically continued also under
Putin and Medvedev. According to Igor Zevelev, this is
because ‘Moscow has always regarded the rights and
interests of the Russian and other Russian-speaking
minorities not as a goal in itself, but as a means to achieve
a leadership role in the territory of the former Soviet Union’
(Zevelev, 2008). Whenever protection of the diaspora has
conﬂicted with other, more important objectives, the dias-
pora has been sacriﬁced on the altar of realpolitik.
3. We may then turn to the third political alternative, to
create a new Russian-dominated state outside Russia,
comparable to the two Serb quasi-states in the former
Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Republika
Srpska Krajina in Croatia. In the former USSR this scenario
has been realized only in one instance, the Dniester
Republic in Moldova. The circumstances that led up to the
establishment of this de facto state were in many respects
unique and non-replicable elsewhere. The decisive factor
that made it possible was the presence of the 14th Soviet
Army on the Dniester left bank which intervened actively
on the side of the separatists in the short civil war in
Moldova in 1992 (Kolstø, Edemsky, et al., 1993).
It is debatable towhat degree the Dniester leaders really
want to have a state of their own or whether they wouldprefer to be included in the Russian Federation as an
exclave similar to Kaliningrad. The Dniester elites seem to
be divided, but in an article which I coauthored in 1998
(Kolstø &Malgin, 1998) we argued that the local population
in the Dniester republic indeed does have a strong sense of
a distinct Dniestrian identity which sustains the idea of
a separate state project outside Russia.
4. Finally, we reach the fourth and last of the political
options open to the Russian diasporians, which is loyalty
towards the state they are living in, their nationalizing state
of residence. When I developed my typology in 1996 I
regarded this as the most likely option, and now, 15 year
later, I stick to my gun.1 Before I move on to a discussion
about which of the three cultural self-identiﬁcations this
political option is most likely to be combined with I will
give my reasons why I believe the trend is moving toward
increasing political localization.
My ﬁrst argument is related to the sudden near collapse
of trafﬁc communications among the former Soviet repub-
lics after perestroika. In the Soviet Union, long distance
travel was remarkably cheap. The limiting factor was not so
much prices as access to attractive tickets, which you could
get through your work place, personal contacts (blat), or in
other ways. In most cases people who wanted to visit
friends or relatives in another republic, could ﬁnd ways to
do so. And verymany did have relatives in other republics. It
was not uncommon to have been born in Kazakhstan,
where the parentswere still living, havingmoved to Estonia
in search of a job, while grandparents, siblings, and uncles
lived in Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Moldova, respectively. As
long as the Soviet Union existed thesewere all places which
one could visit perhaps once every two or three years, but
under perestroika they became all of a sudden off limits. In
some cases visa acquisition and bureaucratic red tape was
the problem, but more importantly, people no longer could
afford these travels. The prices of air tickets soared uncon-
trollably while salaries remained the same, and money had
to be spent on the bare necessities of life. To a much larger
degree than before, the Russian diasporians were literally
stuck in their place of residence.
Another important factor behind the localization of the
Russian diaspora communities is outmigration. Those
Russians in the former Soviet republicswhohave traveled to
Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union, have often
bought a one-way ticket only. The outmigration of Russians
from the republics has not been as large as some observers
expected (for instance Dunlop, 1994), but was nevertheless
quite signiﬁcant, with total ﬁgures in the range of 3–4
million people. Importantly, the outﬂow has been uneven:
very high from some republics and low from others. The
highest ﬁgures are registered in the Caucasian republics,
where the Russian populations were rather small already in
the 1980s (between 40 per cent and 70 per cent out-
migration). In addition, approximately a quarter of the
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the Baltic republics, but only 1–3 per cent in the two Slavic
republics, Ukraine andBelarus, have emigrated (see Tables 4
and 5).
(The ﬁgures cover only the years 1990–2000, but that
was the period when the largest migration took place. As
you will see from the tables, migration tapers off in the late
1990s.)
What I am most interested in here is not migration as
such but how the outmigration has affected the situation of
those who stay behind. Two trends seem to be important.
The ﬁrst is that those who arrived last tend also to be the
ones who left ﬁrst. They had not struck ‘roots’ in the local
environment, and often had stronger networks of friends,
family, and job connections to draw on ‘back home’ And for
them, the expression ‘back home’ did in fact make sense.
A result of this is that those who remained were usually
those who were already best integrated in the new states
andwilling to accept the newcultural and political realities.
Secondly, the returnees, as a rule, were those who were
able to ﬁnd a new job elsewhere. This was much easier for
qualiﬁed people with a high level of education than forTable 4
Net migration of ethnic Russians to and from the new abroad by republic,
1990–1996 (in thousands).
Republic 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Estonia 2.8 3.6 18.7 10.6 8.2 6.2 4.1
Latvia 3.5 5.2 19.7 19.4 19.3 10.7 5.9
Lithuania 5.1 4.5 10.2 13.4 5.4 2.2 8.4
Belarus 5.6 2.0 4.6 1.2 13.3 9.2 3.4
Moldova 3.0 4.9 11.5 3.7 7.0 7.8 7.3
Ukraine 4.9 24.7 12.3 38.5 101.0 64.8 61.7
Armenia 3.6 3.3 5.6 6.4 4.6 2.4 1.6
Georgia 42.9 17.6 35.1 22.9 19.0 14.2 9.1
Azerbaijan 9.5 18.0 29.6 33.8 24.2 15.7 12.3
Kazakhstan 36.3 25.6 82.4 104.4 234.3 143.7 98.2
Kyrgyzstan 16.1 15.5 41.4 66.4 42.9 13.4 7.3
Tajikistan 31.7 14.4 47.1 40.9 25.8 22.3 15.1
Turkmenistan 4.4 4.7 10.9 6.7 13.0 12.2 14.0
Uzbekistan 40.2 27.9 65.2 50.7 93.5 64.2 23.0
Total 199.8 118.5 360.5 419.0 611.5 389.0 271.4
Source: Kolstø (2005, p. 237).
Table 5
Net migration of ethnic Russians to and from the new abroad by republic, 1997–
Republic 1997 1998 1999
Estonia 2.2 1.0 .2
Latvia 4.0 2.4 1.1
Lithuania .5 .5 .2
Belarus .4 2.2 3.7
Moldova 4.2 3.1 2.5
Ukraine 46.7 35.2 13.9
Armenia 1.0 .8 .5
Georgia 5.5 4.4 3.2
Azerbaijan 7.6 4.4 2.2
Kazakhstan 150.5 130.5 79.2
Kyrgyzstan 4.8 3.2 4.4
Tajikistan 9.8 7.4 4.2
Turkmenistan 9.8 5.8 4.4
Uzbekistan 19.7 23.0 22.7
Total 266.7 219.5 135.0
Source: Kolstø (2005, p. 237).manual laborers. As a result, the social structure of the
Russian diaspora population changed, from being top-
heavy, with a signiﬁcant intelligentsia, to become more
proletarian. Up to a point this trend runs at cross purposes
with the one I discussed above since the blue collar workers
among the Russians were often less able, or willing, to
study the local language and learn about the local culture
than were Russians with higher education.
Generally speaking, a number of circumstances force the
Russian diasporians to learn the local language and acquire
a basic knowledge of the country and society they live in. As
their numbers shrink, theyareno longerable tokeepup self-
contained communities outside the titular environment to
the samedegree as before. In several countries theywill also
be barred frommany jobs unless they showawillingness to
integrate. The younger generations who have spent most of
their life – or all of it – in this country, will lead the way and
perhaps pull their parents with them.
In 1996–1998 I led a research team that studied ethnic
integration in twopost-Soviet states, Latvia andKazakhstan.
In that connection we conducted large-scale opinion
surveys in these two countries, inwhichwe asked inter alia,
‘Which country do you regard as your homeland?’ In both
Latvia and Kazakhstan the country of residence came up on
top, with ‘USSR’ as the second most popular option, and
‘Russia’ trailing far behind with only 11–13 percent support
(see Tables 6 and 7).2000 (in thousands), continued.
2000 Total. 1990–2000 Percentage of 1989
population in republic
.3 57.9 12.1
1.0 92.2 10.1
.4 50.8 14.8
-1.6 19 1.4
4.7 59.7 10.6
20.9 340.8 3.0
.6 30.4 70.9
2.9 176.8 51.5
1.8 159.1 40.6
76.7 1161.8 18.7
9.8 225.2 24.6
3.6 222.3 57.3
4.0 89.9 26.9
22.7 452.8 27.4
147.8 3134.8
Table 6
Which country do you regard as your homeland? – ethnic breakdown.
kazakhstan.
Kazakhs Russians
Kazakhstan 73.1 39.9
USSR 13.3 35.7
Kaz SSR 12.2 9.5
Russia 1.1 13.0
Other 0.3 0.2
None – 1.5
Don’t know – 0.2
Absolute ﬁgures 376 409
Source: Kolstø (1999, p. 239).
Table 7
Which country do you regard as your homeland? – ethnic breakdown.
latvia.
Latvians Russians
Latvia 88.7 41.1
USSR 0.5 17.8
LSSR 7.1 21.5
Russia 0.2 11.4
Other 1.1 1.0
None 0.4 2.4
Don’t know 2.0 4.7
Absolute ﬁgures 550 297
Source: Kolstø (1999, p. 239).
Table 8
Do Russians in Kazakhstan differ from Russians in Russia? – ethnic
breakdown.
Kazakhs Russians Ukrainians Germans Koreans
signiﬁcantly 31.6 27.9 22.9 29.3 33.3
somewhat 17.3 21.3 29.2 19.5 6.7
no different 26.9 33.0 25.0 19.5 20.0
Don’t know 24.2 17.8 22.9 31.7 40.0
Absolute ﬁgures 376 409 48 41 15
Source: Kolstø (1999, p. 260).
Table 9
Do Russians in Latvia differ from Russians in Russia? – ethnic breakdown.
Latvians Russians Ukrainians Belarusians Poles Jews
Signiﬁcantly 35.2 41.6 25.0 24.4 31.7 28.6
Somewhat 34.8 35.1 50.0 37.8 19.5 50.0
No 8.7 11.1 25.0 22.2 19.5 21.4
Don’t know 21.3 12.2 0.0 15.6 29.3 0.0
Absolute
ﬁgures
549 296 16 45 41 14
Source: Kolstø (1999, p. 260).
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move their territorial and political allegiance to their state
of residence, we may then turn to a discussion of how their
cultural self-understanding will develop. Will they retain
a cultural identity as being ‘Russian’, and if yes, what
precisely does that mean? Will they be ‘Russian’ like
Russians elsewhere, or develop an identity of their own? As
I have argued above, already in the Soviet period the
Russians outside the Russian republic tended to see them-
selves as somehow different from Russians in the core
group. There is no reason to believe that after the breakup of
the unitary state this trend will be stopped or reversed. As
Natalia Kosmarskaia, one of the most perceptive observers
of the Russian diaspora has observed, the fact that the
Russians in Central Asia and the Baltics felt different from
Russians in Russia during the Soviet period did not carry any
consequences. ‘With the collapse of the Soviet Union,
however, this situation changed radically. The sociopolitical
cataclysms that followed in itswake – radical changes in the
economic situation, themassmigration, and so on – became
a potent stimulus for the Russian-speakers towards a deep-
er and more conscious perception of their separateness.’
(Kosmarskaia, 2006, p. 405, emphasis in the original).
In our 1997 survey in Latvia and Kazakhstan we also
asked, ‘Do Russians in [your country] differ from Russians
in Russia?’ Total ﬁgures for both countries are presented in
Fig. 1 below.
As you will see, more than two thirds of those who
offered an opinion chose one of the two options ‘signiﬁ-
cantly different’ or ‘somewhat different’. When we brokeFig. 1. Perceptions of Russians in the republics as different from/similar to
russians in russia.the ﬁgures down by ethnicity we got the following results
(Tables 8 and 9):What exactly did the perceived peculiarities of the local
Russian culture consist in? We suggested a large number of
possible answers:
1. more active and industrious
2. more cultured and better educated
3. more internationalist
4. more hard-working and diligent
5. less given to drinking
6. more individualistic
7. less drawn into conﬂicts
8. more open and gregarious
9. more hospitable
10. more tolerant toward the views and opinions of others
11. less attached to national traditions and customs
In Kazakhstan the responses from the titulars and the
Russians were remarkably similar. The Latvian breakdown
by ethnicity, however, yielded somewhat different results
(Tables 10 and 11).Table 10
Perceived peculiarities of Russian culture in Kazakhstan. Kazakh and
Russian ranking lists. ‘1’ as ‘agree completely’, ‘4’ as ‘disagree completely’.
Kazakhs Russians
More internationalist 1.8 More internationalist 1.7
More hardworking, diligent 1.8 More hospitable 1.7
More open and gregarious 1.9 More tolerant 1.7
More active and industrious 2.0 More hardworking, diligent 1.8
More cultured and educated 2.0 More open and gregarious 1.8
Less drawn into conﬂicts 2.0 Less drawn into conﬂicts 2.1
More hospitable 2.0 Less given to drinking 2.1
More tolerant 2.0 Less attached to tra`ditions 2.1
Less given to drinking 2.2 More active and industrious 2.2
Less attached to traditions 2.2 More cultured and educated 2.2
More individualistic 2.4 More individualistic 2.6
Table 11
Perceived peculiarities of Russian culture in Latvia. Latvian and Russian
ranking lists. ‘1’ as ‘agree completely’, ‘4’ as ‘disagree completely’.
Latvians Russians
More active and industrious 2.07 More tolerant 1.87
More internationalist 2.32 More hard-working, diligent 1.96
More open and gregarious 2.39 More cultured and educated 1.96
Less attached to traditions 2.43 More active and industrious 2.12
More hard-working, diligent 2.58 Less drawn into conﬂicts 2.12
More hospitable 2.63 More hospitable 2.14
More individualistic 2.64 More open and gregarious 2.25
More cultured and educated 2.69 Less attached to traditions 2.37
More tolerant 2.84 More internationalist 2.39
Less drawn into conﬂicts 2.91 More individualistic 2.61
Less given to drinking 3.06 Less given to drinking 2.65
Source: Kolstø (1999, pp. 262–3).
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Russians in Russia and Russians in Latvia. They were less
willing to give local Russians credit for higher diligence,
hospitality, individualism, and culture compared to
Russians in Russia, and they deﬁnitely did not think that
‘their’ Russians were more cultured, tolerant, and sober or
less conﬂictual than other Russians. Thus, we can draw the
conclusion that in both countries the local Russians saw
themselves as both different from, and better than,
Russians in Russia, but only in Kazakhstan did this self-
image correspond to any signiﬁcant degree with the image
of them which the titular population held.
In a study of cultural adaption of Russian immigrants to
Russia from CIS countries Valentina Gritsenko found that
both the immigrants themselves and the population in the
Russian region where they settled down, distinguished
sharply between old-timers and the new arrivals.
One might think that it would be absurd for Russian
migrants to regard a Russian environment as an alien
cultural milieu. However, this seems to reﬂect a certain
socio-cultural distance between the locals and the
migrants which [is] a result of the acculturation into the
culture of the titular ethnic group which the Russian
migrants underwent [in the republic they had been
living in before they returned] (Gritsenko, 1999, 56).
Gritsenko found that in the Russian regions, negative
evaluations of the newcomers dominated among the indig-
enousRussians overpositive evaluationsbya factorof 50over
32; this critical attitude was more than reciprocated by the
Russianmigrants:whenthenewlyarrivedRussiansdescribed
the local Russians among whom they were now living,
negative statementswere three times as prevalent as positive
statements. Quite unexpectedly for Gritsenko, she also found
that when the Russian migrants were asked to describe the
non-Russians in the republic they had just left, they tended to
respect them farmore than they respectedRussians in Russia.
Positive stereotypeopinionsof the titularnationality theyhad
hitherto been living among dominated over negative
stereotypes by a factor of 70 to 18 (Gritsenko, 1999, p. 57).
One important factor that has contributed to a process of
dissociation of the Russians in the republics from the Russian
core group is the gradual amalgamation of the various non-
titular, post-Soviet diaspora groups. Not only Russians, butalso other Slavs such as Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Poles
live in the same new states and indeed in the same neigh-
borhoods. These people have very much of the same educa-
tional and social proﬁle as the local Russians, and consort and
intermarry with them. Even if some of the non-Russian dia-
sporians retain a measure of proﬁciency also in their own
historical language, their everyday language of converse is
Russian and in most places they are as a matter of course
included into a categoryof ‘Russian-speakers’. In CentralAsia,
where the contrast between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Asians’ is seen
as strong, also ethnic Germans, and in fact also Volga Tatars
are habitually included into this common Russian-speaking
category (Kolstø, 1999, pp. 29–40). At the same time, this
ethnocultural amalgamation has not been a simple one-way
process in which the non-Russian Russian-speakers have
been simply swamped by their Russian neighbors. The non-
Russian diasporians have added some nuances to what is
becoming a new Russophone palette (Laitin, 1998).
The Russian scholar Sergei Savoskul does not, as I do,
believe that Russians in the non-Russian republics group in
the Soviet period developed any sense of being different
from Russians at the center. Savoskul argues that at that
time the Russians were not prepared to become a diaspora
since there was no need for such an identity. In the new
ethnopolitical situation after the demise of the Soviet
Union, however, this has changed fundamentally, he
believes. In 2001 Savoskul wrote that
In themajority of the post-Soviet states the last tenyears
of sovereign development have somewhat hastened the
process of turning the Russian populations in the coun-
tries of the new abroad into new Russian diasporas.
During thisperiod theyhavebecomeconvinced that they
no longer have behind them the formerly mighty
metropolitan state, norwill theyhave it in the future. The
Russian population is ﬁrmly set on remaining in their
respective countries of residence, and have begun to
develop the habits and attitudes of a ‘diasporian’ orien-
tation (Savoskul, 2001, p. 19).
Before we can ﬁnish our analysis, we must also consider
the last and ﬁnal of the identity options of the Russian dia-
sporians,which is assimilation.ManyRussianswhomoved to
Western Europe andNorth America in the 20th century have
lost their collective identityasethnicRussians in the courseof
a generation or two. They have married outside the Russian
community, have forgotten their native tongue and in
general become not only well integrated into their host
countries but been absorbed into it. They regard themselves
no longer as Russians living in France or the USA, but as
Frenchmen and Americans of Russian extraction. To what
degree can we expect the same to happen with Russians in
the ‘new abroad’? This is the basic research question behind
David Laitin’s monumental study Identity in Formation
(Laitin, 1998). Laitin accepts Ernest Gellner’s famous
description of how minorities in multinational states assim-
ilate into metropolitan society (Gellner, 1983). According to
Gellner, while some peasant sons and daughters from
aminority culture in amultiethnic state – allegorically called
‘Ruritanians’ –will become Ruritanian nationalists, most will
accept and adopt the dominant ‘Megalomanian’ culture.
P. Kolstø / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 153–163 163But what will happen when a multinational state breaks
up, such as happened to the Soviet Union? Laitin asks.
Can these processes be reversed? In other words, may
Megalomanians (¼Russians) be turned into Ruritanians and
adopt the culture of the former minority which has now
become the state-bearing nation in a new state? This
intriguing question Laitin approaches from a number of
theoretical and empirical angles andwithﬁeld studies in four
republics, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. I cannot
here go through his often very sophisticated arguments but
jump right to the conclusion: in Kazakhstan he thinks the
answer is ‘no’ – the socio-cultural distance between the
Russian-speakers and the titulars is too large. The Russian
who do not emigrate will continue to live as small isolated
communities. In Latvia and Estonia the answer is ‘yes’ – the
Baltic cultures are so prestigious and the Baltic standard of
living is so high that it will exert an irresistible pull on the
Russians.Finally, inUkraineLaitinpredicts consociationalism,
meaning a continued coexistence of twohigh cultures (Laitin,
1998, pp. 353–61).
I think it is still too early in the day to pass a verdict on
Laitin’s scenarios. If he is right, it means that the adaptation
processes among the Russians who suddenly and unex-
pectedly ended up as national minorities in nationalizing
non-Russians states are going even faster than most
observers would predict. But even if he should be wrong,
we can still safely conclude that also in the unlikely situa-
tion that an irredentist political party should come to
power in Moscow with a programme for the restitution of
the collapsed state (in one form or another) there will be
scant support for such policies among those who are often
regarded as the main victims of this state collapse, the
beached Russian communities in the Soviet successor
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